More Qualifications

So, in my last post, I tried to qualify my previous interest in Sellars' metaphor of the manifest and scientific images, and then I got a bit carried away sermonizing. In the process, I realized I unfairly said somethings about Fodor, Stanley, and Williamson, philosophers whom I admire and who inspire me, even if I don't always agree with them.

So let's set the record straight: Fodor actually has quite a bit to say about modality. Consider this essay from the LRB that ends: " if the methodology of analytic philosophy lacked a rationale pre-Kripke, it continues to do so," which is a conclusion not so different than the one I advocated in my own complaint about modality (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n20/jerry-fodor/waters-water-everywhere). I think Fodor's story is a bit of a stretch, but still, you gotta admit: it's a story, and a riveting historical one at that.

Or take Stanley and Williamson, who have lots to say about metaphilosophy, in blogs and even full length books. (Just for the record, I never meant to imply that they hadn't *said* lots of things about metaphilosophy; I just meant to say that a lot of what they had to say was, in my opinion, politically tinged (not that there's anything wrong with that).)

All this is just to take back what I said before about Fodor, Stanley and Williamson, who are definitely not superficial in the way I described. I guess I am just in the market for a good, non question-begging account of modality. But then again, who isn't.